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Much modern and contemporary philosophy tends to want to explain away 
autonomous self-consciousness and has the propensity to claim that self-awareness 
is only possible if the self is considered as an object. That is, the self is somehow 
constructed; it is really heteronomous. One great question that is certainly implicit 
in both the analytic and continental streams of contemporary philosophy is: does 
the ‘self’ exist after all? After all, a long line of thinkers from Hume to Nietzsche; 
from Wittgenstein to Anscombe; from Malcolm, Kenny and Dennett to Foucault 
and Lacan have all argued, in different ways, that the ‘self’ is a fiction.
Throughout the period of modern and contemporary philosophy, even many 
of those who strongly held that the self does exist tended to maintain a very thin 
view of the self. René Descartes, for example, was only looking for something 
about which he could have certain knowledge that it existed: he could be certain 
of ‘I exist’ as long as the word ‘I’ meant very little.1 In order to avoid the possibility 
of error, ‘I think’ could only imply existence at that very moment; Descartes’ ego 
could well have had no history!
John Locke too had a very thin view of the self. He wanted to avoid relying on 
a soul which cannot be inspected. So, for him, the self has to do with consciousness 
which can be extended backwards through memory of past mental and physical 
events and perhaps forwards to anticipations of events. Hence, for Locke, “the self 
is not determined by identity or diversity of substance, which it cannot be sure of, 
1 See René Descartes, “Second Meditation”, in Oeuvres de Descartes, VII: Meditationes de Prima 
Philosophia, Vol. II, ed. Ch. Adam and P. Tannery (Paris: Vrin, 1964), 3.
but only by identity of consciousness”.2 This leads to notorious problems: at the 
end of the day there is literally no knowable owner of these psychological events.
This very thin view led rather naturally to the denial of the self which David 
Hume notoriously articulates in the 1739 Treatise of Human Nature. There he 
claimed that, although he introspected and could find many perceptions, he 
could never find a ‘self’ connecting them together:3 
In order to justify to ourselves this absurdity, we often feign some new 
and unintelligible principle that connects the objects together, and 
prevents their interruption or variation. Thus we feign the continu’d 
existence of the perceptions of our sense, to remove the interruption; 
and run into the notion of a soul, and self, and substance, to disguise 
the variation.4
He challenged the role of memory as a possible connective and went on to say:
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, 
I always stumble on some particular perception or other … I never 
catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe 
anything but a perception … [human beings] are nothing but a 
bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed one 
another with an inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual flux 
and movement.5
This Humean denial of the self influenced much contemporary analytic 
philosophy. However, it first greatly influenced Immanuel Kant who agreed with 
Hume that the concepts ‘I’ or ‘self’ do not pick out any object. Kant wanted to 
insist that the ‘I that thinks’ is a transcendental or logical – hence unknowable 
– subject ‘captured’ by means of apperception. He held that self-consciousness is 
not a cognitive attitude; ‘I think’ is a heuristic function of all possible experience 
without itself being a possible datum of understanding; ‘I think’ is not actual self-
awareness but rather it is the specific form of consciousness. Hence, Kant thinks 
that the ‘I’ is not an object and it can, under no circumstance, be turned into an 
intentional object.6 Conversely, ‘I exist thinking’ is an empirical proposition that 
2 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), 
II, xxvii, 23.
3 See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), Book 1, Part 4, Section 6, 252.
4 Ibid., 254.
5 Ibid., 252.
6 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: 
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can be further expressed through synthetic judgements that depend on given 
intuitions.7 Hence, there is a difference between the person who experiences her life 
in space and time and the ‘I’ in the sense of the subject. The former can be known 
as object; the latter cannot be known but remains a ‘formal pole’. This, in itself, 
was an enormously acute insight: Kant notes that the third-person perspective 
and the first-person perspective are irreducible to one another. This sets him apart 
from his German idealist successors,8 and also from more contemporary post-
structuralists, who all rely on a third-person perspective from which, somehow, a 
first-person perspective could emerge. It must be said, however, that Kant believes 
that self-consciousness cannot exist except within processes of experiencing 
something. There can be no knowledge of the ‘I’ or the ‘self’ beyond the experiences 
one has. Object is irreducible to subject; empirical self-consciousness is not the 
transcendental self. This means that the science of psychology can have nothing 
to say about the transcendental ‘I’ of apperception. Once again, the subject ‘I’ 
has become as thin as can be. It has become a mere formal space.
These last two centuries have continued to witness a decline of ‘thick’ 
subjective vocabulary. The German philosophers broadly criticised the ‘I as subject’ 
conception of subjectivity: Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, for instance, show no 
inclination to presuppose a subject in the sense of an individual unique person. 
To take G.W.F. Hegel, while he believes that there is no consciousness without 
self-consciousness,9 he also thinks that there can be no self-consciousness without 
intersubjectivity; he holds that there cannot be a subject that does not think of itself 
as essentially a ‘we’. Hegel avers that “self-consciousness is desire”.10 That is, self-
consciousness is not self-regarding but it is self-positing where self-consciousness 
cannot be wholly autonomous or self-relating; the world of experience must be 
implied and retained. In reporting what I think – even to myself – I am really 
reporting what I take to be true; in being aware of what I desire, I am really 
avowing a possible plan of action in the world. In his fourth chapter of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit he discusses precisely this desire, the struggle to the death for 
recognition between subjects and the resultant master–slave social structure. Here, 
Hegel treats self-consciousness as a practical matter which requires striving and 
even struggle. It involves both self-affirming and self-negating; it issues judgements 
but is also aware that what it resolves to be the case might not be the case. This 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), B408.
7 See ibid., B428.
8 Broadly, in German idealism, Ich does not refer to the subject but rather to general features 
of human consciousness.
9 See Georg W.F. Hegel, The Berlin Phenomenology, trans. Michael John Petry (Dordrecht: Riedel, 
1981), 55.
10 Georg W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §167, trans. James Black Baillie (New York: Cosimo 
Inc., 2005), 225.
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means that there is opposition between self-consciousness and itself, a kind of 
self-estrangement which one must overcome. Self-consciousness is a negation 
of the otherness of experience; one is driven to overcome the indeterminacy, 
opaqueness, otherness, and disconnectedness of one’s experience to reduce it 
to unity. Crucially, self-consciousness is an achievement which is, moreover, 
inherently social: “Self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-
consciousness”.11 It exists only as recognized. A subject can only be related to itself 
and the world within the context of conflicting desires. The relevant desire is that 
for recognition by others where there is a confrontation between two desirers in 
which each is not simply to be negated but negates back in deadly reciprocity. This 
is a contention that can only be resolved through the complete subjugation of 
one to the other; a tension which paradoxically means a historicised or dialogical 
account of rationality. Fundamentally, self-conscious beings do not have natures; 
they only have histories. And the history of self-consciousness requires an “Ego 
that is ‘we’, a plurality of Egos and ‘we’ that is a single Ego”.12
The decline of the self was accelerated through the suspicion of thinkers like 
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Darwin and Freud who all raised doubts with respect 
to the alleged sovereignty of the self: the self is too opaque or slippery to be taken 
seriously.
Nietzsche’s denial of the self, in particular, was greatly influential within the 
continental tradition. In 1887, in On the Genealogy of Morals he wrote:
There is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming. ‘The doer’ is 
merely a fiction added to the deed – the deed is everything … our 
entire science still lies under the misleading influence of language 
and has not disposed of that little changeling, the ‘subject’.13
In contemporary philosophy this demise of the ‘self’ was rather loudly 
proclaimed by prominent proponents of both sides of the analytic–continental 
divide. Poststructuralists like Michel Foucault declared the death of the subject.14 
Analytic philosophers like Gilbert Ryle interpreted self-consciousness as merely a 
higher order state of consciousness: “To concern oneself about oneself in any way, 
theoretical or practical, is to perform a higher order act, just as it is to concern 
oneself about anybody else”.15 This would mean that self-consciousness, in the 
11 Ibid., §175, 226.
12 Ibid., §177, 227.
13 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, transl. Walter Kaufman and Reginald John 
Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Press, 1967), i, 13.
14 See Michel Foucault, Les Mots et Les Choses: Une Archéologie de Sciences Humaines (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1966), 333ff.
15 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949), 195.
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strict sense, does not exist: self-consciousness would have to do with first-person 
consciousness and this could not exist; only second- or third-person consciousness 
could be had. This is also taken to mean that self-identification could have nothing 
to do with self-consciousness understood in the subjective sense.
This leaves us with a number of related questions. One question is whether one 
could speak of a self. That is, could one speak of an ‘I’ as distinct from speaking of 
a ‘me’? Another question has to do with the possibility of self-consciousness; that 
is consciousness of meself16 … but in the first person. One needs to ask whether 
self-consciousness is completely dependent on one’s relationships with others and 
on one’s belonging to a linguistic community. That is, is consciousness prior to 
self-consciousness, or is self-consciousness – in the strong subjective sense – the 
primordial human capability? In this paper, I want to show that the many denials 
of self in the philosophical literature seem wrong. I also want to say something 
about the rich conception of the self in ancient philosophy and the way in which 
controversies over the self in ancient and mediaeval philosophy could help to 
illumine our contemporary notion of the self. After all, how could one retrieve 
the self? Does the self need rescuing after all?
Perhaps we can commence by noting that we can consider two paradigmatic 
ways of conceiving of the self in modern and contemporary philosophy.
One trend is to consider the self to be the principle of identity that stands 
apart from the stream of consciousness and which structures, and gives unity and 
coherence to this stream. This concept of self is a very formal and abstract one. 
The ‘I’ is seen as a pure subject or formal pole enabling experience. It cannot be 
experienced but must be presupposed. It is not given in any way but is a principle 
that I must presuppose to know any object.17 It is paradigmatically seen as pure 
activity. The ‘I’ is defined solely by its use; it has no referential function. To quote 
the early Wittgenstein:
We feel then that in the cases in which ‘I’ is used as subject, we 
don’t use it because we recognize a particular person by his bodily 
characteristics; and this creates the illusion that we use this word to 
refer to something bodiless, which, however, has its seat in the body. 
In fact this seems to be the real ego, the one of which it was said 
‘Cogito ergo sum’.18
16 This is what the Oxford English Dictionary says of the emphatic ‘I myself’ where “mē is perhaps 
a kind of ethical dative”. After all we say ‘himself’ and not ‘hisself’. See Richard Sorabji, Self 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 20.
17 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A402.
18 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), 69.
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Hence, the ‘I’ has a peculiar grammar:
The word ‘I’ does not mean the same as ‘L.W.’ even if I am L.W., 
nor does it mean the same as the expression ‘the person who is now 
speaking’. But that doesn’t mean: that ‘L.W.’ and ‘I’ mean different 
things. All it means is that these words are different instruments in 
our language.19
This means that any knowledge of oneself must be primordially practical. 
The subjective self is simply active, transcendental in a solely practical sense. It 
is purely autonomous. In Elizabeth Anscombe’s development of Wittgenstein’s 
writings about our use of ‘I’, she points out that there can be no question of 
searching for, or discovering, an entity corresponding to pure consciousness that 
serves as a principle of unity for one to be able to think of oneself. Nor does one 
gain knowledge of one’s own mental states by looking inward, as it were: there 
is no question of knowing one’s mental states by regarding these as objects of 
one’s internal gaze. According to Anscombe, ‘I’, when used as subject, does not 
refer at all.20
A second way is to see the self as something evolving in being realised through 
one’s projects. One is not a self; one is the result of self-interpretation. This view 
takes the self to be a construction. Selfhood is captured in self-knowledge which 
19 Ibid., 67. Indeed, Wittgenstein passed through a number of stages in his thinking where 
he initially considered that ‘I’ can be used in two different ways: as subject and as object 
(notably in his Philosophical Remarks and, to a more attenuated degree, in his Blue Book). 
There, he averred that, when used as subject, there is no recognition of a person, nor is there 
any possibility of misidentification. Examples of this kind of use are ‘I think it will rain,’ or 
‘I have a toothache’. What is typical of the use of ‘I’ as object is that it involves reference 
or recognition of a particular person. According to the Blue Book, ‘I’ is used as object when 
the grounds for the attribution of the particular predicate are available, and when it is also 
possible that one errs in the ascription. Obvious examples of such cases are ‘I have grown 
six inches’ and ‘I have a bump on my forehead’ (see Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown Books, 
66f.). In such cases, he argued, ‘I’ is evidently being used demonstratively to indicate the 
object referred to; one may be wrong in what one says when one uses ‘I’ in such a fashion. 
He eventually realized, however that such thinking is a residue of Cartesian dualism: he 
saw, that even in sentences like ‘I have broken my arm’ there is no logical possibility of 
misidentification of oneself for another person, or mistake in this regard. In exceptional 
circumstances, one could, at most, mistake one’s arm for another’s: one could, perhaps, 
mistakenly attribute to oneself what would be correctly attributable to another. Such 
observations probably led to the collapse of the essential duality of the distinction in 
Wittgenstein’s writing after the Blue Book. In the light of Wittgenstein’s later work, it would, 
perhaps, be better to speak of a whole spectrum of non-referring sentences in the first-person, 
rather than a duality of uses of ‘I’.
20 See G.E.M. Anscombe, “The First Person”, in Metaphysics and Philosophy of Mind: Collected 
Philosophical Papers, Vol. II (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), 21-36.
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is expressed though narrative, where one provides a plot that brings out certain 
aspects that one deems to be of special significance and that define who one is, 
and that one presents to others for recognition and approval.21 One recounts a 
narrative that ‘emplots’ where one is coming from and where one is heading, 
where the self is constructed in and through the narrative itself. In Paul Ricoeur’s 
terms, ipse ultimately depends on idem in retaining a conception of the self.22 
Such a narrative could be more or less fragmented, or more or less integrated but 
is always ‘under construction’. According to this view, the self does not exist but 
is made and remade through complex social interactions. One cannot be a self 
on one’s own but only in relation with others, as part of a linguistic community. 
One cannot be a self without using language. This is a heteronomous view of the 
self. The self is endlessly linguistically re-constructed … there is no subject; there 
is only an infinitely pliable virtual object. 
Here we seem to be torn between an infinitesimally thin autonomous self 
and a thick plastic heteronomous self with very little possible communication 
between the two. Two interrelated questions arise: one wants to ask whether the 
first conception of self as ‘I’ could not plausibly be ‘thicker’ and one also queries 
whether the second notion of the self (the ‘me’) does not call for an anchor in a 
thicker ‘I’ self.
Now, I want to show that the ‘I’ or self as indexical is irreplaceable to guide 
actions and to have beliefs. I further want to show that the ‘I’ is irreducible to 
the ‘me’: the first person is irreducible to the third person. I want to go on to 
say that the narrative self presupposes a subject or owner of beliefs and actions, 
psychological states, and bodily characteristics; that is, idem needs ipse to retain 
a concept of the self who possesses a meaningful identity.
Of course, the self – and self-knowledge – is certainly idiosyncratic! In much 
contemporary continental philosophy, for instance, it is held that self-awareness 
itself is simply impossible for the reason that the subject and the object of 
awareness must be distinct from one another. One can know oneself only as 
object; never as subject. 
Here, it could be interesting to point out that it was Plato who started a tradition 
of doubt as to whether self-knowledge is even possible due to his misgivings about 
the comparable case of vision. For Plato, self-awareness is at best difficult and, 
ultimately, is only possible through seeing oneself as reflected in another. Indeed, 
this difficulty is connected to the aporia – rather widely discussed in antiquity – 
considering that self-awareness appears prima facie to be necessarily contentless. 
After all, it is doubtful whether one can see that one is seeing; one sees colour and 
21 See Paul Ricoeur, Temps et Récit, Vol. III (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1985), 442-443.
22 See Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1992), 113-118.
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shape and not seeing itself.23 If this is true, then self-encouragement, self-questioning, 
self-persuasion, and self-deception would all be cases where one part of the self 
moves another as Aristotle claims in the Physics for the self-movement of material 
things.24 However, Aristotle himself would claim that self-thought is different: in 
the act of thinking, the intellect is identical with whatever it thinks and hence 
the intellect can think itself.25 In the case of a divine intellect that is pure act, this 
happens directly, continuously and effortlessly; in the case of our understanding, 
perception, opinion and discursive thought (which all include material processes), 
Aristotle claims that this happens as a side-effect.26 In whichever case, for Aristotle, 
self-thought would not be contentless. The divine thinker, for example, may be 
thinking of the first principle of practical reason and, in so doing, would be thinking 
itself since, in so thinking, the proposition it is thinking is, in a way, identical with 
itself. The human thinker would apprehend himself as he is apprehending – in this 
case – the first principle of practical reason, and as apprehending himself, and as 
apprehending that he is apprehended by himself.27
Now this could all be very well but one still appears to face the difficulty of a 
possible infinite regress in self-awareness. As Sextus Empiricus pointed out, if one 
part is apprehending another part, how would the apprehending part be, in its 
turn, apprehended? Does not an infinite regress of acts of awareness threaten?28 
One is reminded of the infinite regress of images in two parallel mirrors. This 
difficulty is similar to the first in that it hinges upon the supposition that the whole 
cannot be both apprehended and apprehender. However, once again, one needs 
to consider that the whole could be both apprehender and apprehended – just as 
what is taught could be identical with what is learnt.29 An infinite regress of acts 
of self-awareness does not even begin.
Perhaps the greatest exponent of a certain autonomy of self-knowledge was 
Augustine. He held that the soul knows itself by being present to itself.30 So the soul 
does not need to seek itself nor does the soul need to see itself reflected in the eyes 
of another. To put it clearly, for Augustine, soliloquy is prior to communication.31 
Self-knowledge is prior to knowledge. There are, of course, possible mistakes in 
23 See Plato, Charmides 167A–169C.
24 See Aristotle, Physics, vii, 1 (241b34-242a35); he points out that it is different with that which 
is immaterial (see Aristotle, Physics, viii, 5).
25 See Aristotle, On the Soul, iii, 4 (430a2-4); Metaphysics, xii, 7 (1072b20-24).
26 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, xii, 9 (1074b35).
27 See Sorabji, Self, 210.
28 See Sextus Empiricus in his Adversus Mathematicos, 7.284-286; 310-312.
29 See Aristotle, Physics iii, 3. See also Aristotle, On the Soul, iii, 2 (425b26ff.), where he says that 
some perception will be of itself so that we ought to posit this in the first instance. Hence, no 
infinite regress ensues.
30 See Augustine, On the Trinity, x, 3. 5; x, 7. 10; x, 9. 2; x, 10. 16; x, 8. 1.
31 This same position is shared by Husserl in his later writings.
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self-knowledge but these are due to a reliance on images and traces of bodily 
things.32 The soul is more internal to itself than any images or words could be.
Does this mean that the soul knows itself completely? Of course not! There 
are two levels of self-awareness. One is what Augustine called nosse, or notitia; 
the other is cogitare. The former is possessed continuously throughout one’s life 
– it is possessed even by infants and is therefore implicit and background and 
non-cognitive; the latter is a matter of thinking about oneself which requires a 
turning back on oneself which can well be impeded by the bodily senses. Nosse, 
therefore, is bound to the memory: just as a person knows letters even when she 
is thinking of other things not of letters, so the person knows herself even when 
she is not thinking of herself.33 Through nosse, the soul already knows itself as a 
whole even if it does not know the whole of itself.34 The soul is always present to 
itself even in the infant. Cogitare is about the soul, “thinking itself, not as across 
a space but by an incorporeal conversion”.35 The relationship between the two is 
brought out in the following:
When by thinking the mind views itself as understood, it does not 
generate that knowledge it has as if it had previously been unknown 
to itself. Rather, it was customarily known to itself in the way that 
things are known that are contained by memory, even if they are not 
thought.36
As Augustine very famously put it:
But who will doubt that he lives, remembers, understands, wills, 
thinks, knows, and judges? For even if he doubts, he lives. If he 
doubts where his doubt comes from, he remembers. If he doubts, he 
understands that he doubts. If he doubts, he wants to be certain. If he 
doubts, he thinks. If he doubts, he knows that he does not know. If he 
doubts, he judges that he ought not rashly to give assent. So whoever 
acquires a doubt from any source ought not to doubt any of these 
things whose non-existence would mean that he could not entertain 
doubt about anything.37
32 See Augustine, On the Trinity, x, 3. 5; x, 5. 7 - 10, 6. 8; x, 10. 16.
33 See ibid., xiv, 6. 8-9.
34 See ibid., x, 4. 6.
35 Ibid., xiv, 6. 8-9, lines 31-32.
36 Ibid., xiv, 6. 8-9, lines 45-49.
37 Ibid., x, 10. 14.
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Hence, for Augustine, one is by nature present to oneself even if one could 
absent oneself from oneself by searching for oneself outside oneself through images. 
That would be an act of dispersion. One does not come to know oneself by seeking 
oneself outside oneself; neither does one come to know oneself primarily through 
others: the soul is fundamentally present to itself and does not need to seek itself.38 
38 The problem of self-awareness and self-knowledge is later discussed by Thomas Aquinas in 
a small number of texts in which the principal philosophical concern appears to be that of 
reconciling the Augustinian and Aristotelian approaches to the soul’s knowledge of itself. 
To this effect, Aquinas uses a basic psychological fact – the experience of intellectual self-
awareness – which he generally expresses by the phrase, hic homo (singularis) intelligit ‘this 
individual human being understands’. He holds this to be a basic human experience that all 
readily acknowledge as real and central to our lives (see Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 
I, q. 76, a. 1, where he goes on to say “For each one of us experiences himself to be the one who 
understands” [“experitur enim unusquisque seipsum esse qui intelligit”]). In the Summa, Aquinas 
goes on to distinguish two different ways in which the soul knows itself through its own act: one 
particular, the other universal. The universal type yields the sort of knowledge which Aquinas 
identifies as involving “diligent and subtle inquiry”. Conversely, the particular knowledge that 
the intellect has of itself through its act refers to the simple act of self-awareness, “according 
to which Socrates or Plato perceives himself to have an intellective soul, from the fact that he 
perceives himself to understand” (percipit se intelligere). For this sort of knowledge, unlike the 
other, “the presence itself of the mind (ipsa mentis praesentia), which is the principle of the act 
by which the mind perceives itself, suffices.” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 87, a. 1). 
An earlier and more detailed examination of the mode of human self-awareness is to 
be found in De Veritate x, 8. There, Aquinas uses a slightly different terminology, but 
his position remains the same. In his discussion, the basic division of self-awareness is 
expressed in terms of common (commune) and proper (proprium) knowledge. Once again, 
the soul’s common knowledge of itself is identified as the only manner through which the 
soul apprehends its own nature. The soul’s proper knowledge of itself is that which pertains 
to the soul “according as it has being in such and such an individual,” and, as in the 
Summa, it is described in epistemic terms that are more vague, as the knowledge whereby 
one “perceives that he has a soul” (percipit se habere animam). Here, the common mode of 
knowledge is described as knowledge of the soul’s nature – its quid est – and of its proper 
accidents (per se accidentia eius), whereas the proper mode is merely knowledge by the 
soul of whether it exists – its an est (see Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate x, 8 [321b207-216]). 
The De Veritate also introduces a further distinction between actual and habitual self-
knowledge. Actual self-knowledge refers to the soul’s specific perception of itself through 
its acts – its awareness, at the time, that it is exercising some activity. For this sort of self-
knowledge, Aquinas emphasizes – in an Aristotelian fashion – the need for the intellect to be 
actualized by some object, since “to understand something is prior to understanding that one 
understands” (Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate x, 8 [321b229-234]). Habitual knowledge, however, 
seems to involve a direct, non-Aristotelian mode of knowledge of the self: “But as for habitual 
knowledge, I say this, that the soul sees itself through its essence, that is, from the fact that its 
essence is present to itself, it is able to enter into the act of knowing itself” (Thomas Aquinas, 
De Veritate x, 8 [321b234-238]). The spontaneity of this kind of self-knowledge resembles the 
effortlessness with which someone who has acquired a habit can with ease embark upon 
the use of that habit, as a grammarian, for example, can easily speak grammatically at 
any moment (See Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate x, 8 [321b238-322a246]). The soul’s habitual 
knowledge of itself thus seems to indicate that the soul, by its mere presence to itself, is already 
438
The QuesT for AuThenTiciTy And humAn digniTy
One might want to add that – most unlike Descartes – where there is presence to 
self, there is time.
Now this certainly appears to be counterintuitive to many. Much contemporary 
German and French philosophy sets store on the idea that the self is nothing but 
a web of relationships. Others enter and form one’s identity which is understood 
as a persona or a woven narrative. One’s conception of oneself is nothing but the 
web of relations that is thereby formed through time.
This ‘relational’ conception of the self which also has a venerable history 
and should be taken seriously. The idea that one knows oneself through knowing 
others so that others enable one to know oneself is to be found even in ancient 
Greek philosophy.
Plato in the First Alcibiades notes that “if an eye is to see itself, it has to look 
at [another’s] eye … with a soul too, if it is to know itself, it must look at a soul, 
and especially at that place in a soul where the excellence of a soul is generated, 
namely wisdom”.39 Plato goes on to say that the soul does so best by looking at 
the clearest and purest and brightest mirror of them all – God.40 Aristotle too 
often appears to agree that self-knowledge is the fruit of knowledge of others. 
His position is far more nuanced however. He speaks of both self-knowledge and 
self-love, where love for friends appears to be based on love for self, whereas self-
knowledge appears to be based on knowledge of others.41 Nevertheless, he also 
thinks that “as the good man is related to himself, so he is related to his friend, 
for the friend is another self”.42 Here he appears to start from one’s inevitable 
awareness of one’s own activities and then coming to appreciate one’s friend. 
Perhaps one can understand better what Aristotle could have in mind if one 
continues to read the passage which states:
able to apprehend that it thinks, senses, is alive, and so on; it does not need to acquire 
anything in order to realize actual knowledge of its an est. Rather, it is already in possession of 
such a disposition from the outset; nothing needs to happen to it in order that it acquires self-
awareness. Habitual self-knowledge is already present then but, it, of itself, does not provide 
any knowledge of one’s own nature. The soul knows itself actually in the same manner that it 
knows other objects, namely, by abstracting from images, forming concepts and judgments, 
and acquiring intelligible species (See Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, x, 8 [322a247-b95]). See 
Deborah L. Black, “Consciousness and Self-Knowledge in Aquinas’s Critique of Averroës’s 
Psychology”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 (1993): 23–59.
39 Plato, First Alcibiades, 132E-133C.
40 See ibid., 133C.
41 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, viii, 12 (1161b18-19; 27-29); ix, 8 (1168b5-10).
42 Ibid., ix, 9 (1170a29-b14).
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He needs, therefore, to be conscious of the existence of his friend as 
well. And this will be realised in their living together and sharing of 
discussion and thought; for this is what living together would seem to 
mean in the case of man, and not, as in the case of cattle, feeding in 
the same place.43
Here, Aristotle appears to be alluding to the phenomenon of shared perceiving 
between friends where one does not only perceive the same thing as one’s friend 
but one is also aware that each is perceiving the same thing. If this is true, then 
this shared perception appears to presuppose one’s self-perception and self-
knowledge. He says elsewhere that “life in society is perception and knowledge 
in common. And self-perception and self-knowledge is most desirable to every 
one”.44 Thus, although friendship between good people enhances self-awareness, 
self-awareness appears to be implied in shared perceiving between friends. This 
appears to be confirmed by Aristotle’s affirmation that one is always aware of 
one’s own activities such as one’s seeing, hearing, walking, perceiving, thinking, 
remembering, living and existing.45 Thus, he appears to disagree with Plato – and 
go along some of the way with Augustine – on the soul’s invariable self-awareness 
of its own activities. Aristotle believes that self-awareness is necessary if one is to 
be able to judge that the perceptions of sweet and white belong to a single body 
precisely because such a judgement requires a recognition of the simultaneity 
of one’s perceptions, and also because one also needs to discriminate correctly 
between the senses involved in one’s own perception of sweet and one’s own 
perception of white:46 they are different kinds of perception of the same object. 
Hence, perception does not only imply the activity of one’s perceiving but also 
involves one’s self-perception. For Aristotle, after all, it seems that knowledge 
implies self-knowledge.
It is very interesting that Aristotle based some of his arguments for self-
knowledge on what has been called ‘shared attention’ or ‘joint attention’. This 
uniquely human capacity is observable at around the ninth month. The infant 
becomes aware of herself as a conscious being as she becomes aware of her carer 
as a conscious being. That is, the infant not only gazes attentively but tries to 
make the carer align her gaze with hers and thus finds pleasure in this successful 
alignment.47 Another similar phenomenon is that of ‘social referencing’ where the 
43 Ibid., ix, 9 (1170b13-14).
44 Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, vii, 12 (1244b24-25).
45 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ix, 9 (1170a29-30); See also On Sense Perception, 437a27-29; 
On the Soul, iii, 2 (425b12-25), On Memory, 452b26-28.
46 See Aristotle, On Sense Perception, 447b10-448a1.
47 See Michael Tomasello, “On the Interpersonal Origins of Self-Concept”, in The Perceived Self, 
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infant seeks the approval of the carer.48 At this stage, it appears that the infant 
becomes self-aware of her psychological attributes. She begins to be aware of 
herself as a being with mental activities. It is interesting that this takes place in 
relationship. Pace Descartes, the infant does not infer that her carer’s consciousness 
exists through an interpretation of her carer’s behaviour and clothing. Nor 
could her awareness of her carer and her self-awareness be separated: both are 
intertwined in one experience. What appears to happen is that the infant becomes 
aware of the divergence between her own attention and her carer’s attention.
Very interestingly, what appears to happen earlier in the infant’s life is also 
reminiscent of some of Aristotle’s views. Richard Sorabji, basing himself on the 
work of Ulrich Neisser, Colwyn Trevarthen and others, notes that:
Infants do not, and cannot afford to, see the world as mere spectators 
perceiving patches of colour. They need to see the world, if they are 
to cope with it, in relation to themselves. They have to see things as 
within reach or out of reach of themselves, as likely to support them 
or note, as in danger of colliding with them or not.49
Of course, one could argue that, perhaps, the infant should be described as 
seeing in terms of ‘within reach’ or ‘out of reach’ without any specification of ‘I’. 
But this merely appears to mean that the ‘I’ is not in contrast to anybody else; 
the infant does appear to be aware of her bodily self. In Brian O’ Shaughnessy’s 
view, the infant starts with awareness of her mouth in relation to the breast. Her 
self-awareness – and awareness expands from there.50 This appears to concur with 
Aristotle’s views on infancy. What strengthens the connection with Aristotle is 
the idea, in some contemporary analytic writings, that the content of perception 
need not be conceptual. Christopher Peacocke notes that one can perceive a 
mountainside as having a very particular crinkly shape without having a concept 
of the distinctive shape.51 Gareth Evans agrees.52 Aristotle notes that one can 
consider rudimentary concepts that may be extended to animals.53 Perhaps one 
ed. Ulrich Neisser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 174-184, in Sorabji, Self, 
25.
48 See Saul Feinman, “Social Referencing in Infancy”, Merrill-Palmer Quarterly 28 (1982): 445-
470, in Sorabji, Self, 26.
49 Sorabji, Self, 23.
50 See Brian O’ Shaughnessy, The Will (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 244-281.
51 See Christopher Peacocke, “Analogue Content”, in Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, 
supplementary volume 60 (1986), 1-17.
52 See Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 229.
53 See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, ii, 19 (99b35-100b5).
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could say, with Peacocke and Evans and José Luis Bermúdez,54 that infants see 
things as within reach of themselves without having a concept of themselves. The 
infant’s self-awareness – of its bodily self – could well be non-conceptual. Bermúdez 
claims that these primitive forms of self-consciousness are already present at birth:
If the pick-up of self-specifying information starts at the very beginning 
of life, then there ceases to be so much of a problem about how entry 
into the first-person perspective is achieved. In a very important sense, 
infants are born into the first-person perspective. It is not something 
that they have to acquire ab initio.55
Thus, a newborn does not need to grasp concepts of pain, thirst or hunger in 
order to feel a kind of self-sensitivity. Moreover, it appears plausible that infants’ 
very learning of speech depends on the prior capacity of shared attention. In 
learning to speak, the child sees herself, the significant other, and the object being 
referred to as all being involved in shared attention. This appears to apply both 
to the theoretical sphere wherein things are named and to the practical sphere in 
which objects are manipulated.56 After all, both spheres are intertwined.
These are not strict arguments for the ‘self’. I am simply saying that our 
experience of the world is in terms of ‘I’ and ‘I again’. I am also stating that this 
appears to be a condition for the possibility of experience itself. While this is not a 
formal proof, it does place the onus of disproof on the person who wants to show 
that that on which life experience depends is only an illusion.
Indeed, it appears that we cannot experience or cope with the world at all 
without this being in terms of ‘I’. Indexicals, like ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘present’ and ‘I’ are 
irreplaceable because they guide self-understanding and action. ‘Thank goodness 
that’s over’ “certainly doesn’t mean the same as, e.g. ‘Thank goodness the date of 
the conclusion of that thing is [Friday, December 5, 2014]’, even if it be said then. 
(Nor, for that matter, does it mean ‘Thank goodness the conclusion of that thing 
is contemporaneous with this utterance’. Why should anyone thank goodness for 
that?”.57 
In a similar manner, if Mark Sultana knows ‘Mark Sultana is to catch the 
plane on the 23 December 2014’, he will have no idea of what he is to do unless 
he also knows ‘I am Mark Sultana’, and ‘Today is the 5 December 2014, so that 
54 See José Luis Bermúdez, The Paradox of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge/ma: MIT Press, 1998), 54-
58.
55 Ibid., 128.
56 See Tomasello, “On the Interpersonal Origins of Self-Concept”, in The Perceived Self, 174-184, in 
Sorabji, Self, 28.
57 Arthur N. Prior, “Thank Goodness That’s Over”, in Philosophy 34 (1959): 17.
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the 23 December is 18 days away’. Otherwise Mark Sultana could be anyone 
and the 23 December 2014 could be any day. Now, ‘I’ could perhaps be roughly 
paraphrased by other indexicals, like ‘The thinker of this thought’, or ‘This person’, 
that are egocentric or token-reflexive.58 However, ‘I’ thoughts have a meaning 
which goes beyond ‘Mark Sultana’ thoughts, where this meaning is essential 
for Mark Sultana to live as a person in a responsible manner with others in the 
world. Indeed, I hold that there are no conceptual problems in one’s use of ‘I’ to 
refer to oneself. ‘I’ can refer, since I am a person among other persons and, in 
order to use ‘I’, I must understand that to be a first person is also to be a third 
person (and this, not in the sense that I am only a third person for others, but 
that I can make sense of identifying a person, conceived from the standpoint of 
an objective view of the world, as myself).59 That is, I must be able to attribute 
to myself various properties, which I can conceive of as being satisfied by beings 
that are not necessarily myself, and be able to conceive of myself as a being of 
the kind that I identify when I conceive of someone in my position (say, someone 
observing a house; alternatively, one could even focus on the pure spatial relation 
between oneself and the house). In this sense, thinking of myself would require a 
certain kind of keeping track of myself.60 However, while an ‘I’ thought is true if 
and only if the corresponding ‘Mark Sultana’ thought is true, one fact that I must 
know to be able to be a personal and responsible agent is ‘I am Mark Sultana’. 
Even more primitively, for me to be aware, I need to be self-aware.
Now, it is almost a truism that all our experiences are characterised by a 
subjective ‘feel’; a certain phenomenal quality of ‘what it is like for me’.61 This is 
obviously true for bodily sensations like pain and hunger but it is also true for 
perceptual experiences, feelings and moods. There is something it is like to see a 
sunset, or to feel happy or loved. There is also something it is like to have beliefs. 
There is a qualitative ‘feel’ or experiential dimension to, say, belief in God, which 
is different from that in disbelief in the existence of God. Of course, the intentional 
object of one’s sensations, perception, feelings or beliefs is, in principle, public. Two 
persons could be feeling the same pain, or enjoying the same sunset, or sharing 
belief in God. However, they cannot share the subjective ‘feel’ of each experience. 
One’s sensations, feelings and thoughts are immediately characterised by a first-
person ‘givenness’ that immediately and non-inferentially presents them as mine. 
As Wittgenstein memorably argued, it is meaningless to be in doubt about whether 
58 See Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge/ma: Harvard University Press, 1983), 
71-114.
59 See Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference, 210.
60 See John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge/ma: Harvard University Press, 1994), 102.
61 See Thomas Nagel, “What is it Like to be a Bat?”, Philosophical Review 83 (1974): 436, and 
John R. Searle The Rediscovery of Mind (Cambridge/ma: MIT Press, 1992), 131-132.
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I am the one who avers ‘I think it will rain,’ or ‘I have a toothache’. I cannot be 
in doubt or mistaken about who the subject of those utterances is, if the subject 
is myself.62 In each case, the avowal is presented precisely as mine. Of course, the 
concomitant ‘I’ consciousness need not be strong. Nor need it be explicit. It may 
well be athematic and implicit. Nor need it be a special manifest experience of 
self. In this sense, self-consciousness appears to be continuous and is pre-reflective; 
it is tacitly present even if one is not consciously scrutinizing oneself. Primitively, 
this speaks of “the acquaintance with an experience in its first-personal mode 
of presentation, that is, from ‘within’”.63 Thus, I am never only conscious of an 
object, but I am always somehow conscious of my experience of the object where 
this experience is not reflective, although it could become reflective.
Conversely, reflective self-consciousness is an articulated and lived 
development of this more primitive self-consciousness. Reflective self-
consciousness is the more developed kind of self-consciousness and is often 
expressed in narrative form. It is an exercise using introspection and memory 
where one directs one’s intentional gaze onto oneself, taking oneself and one’s 
history as an object. This way of seeing the self as evolving and as the result 
of self-interpretation (as I referred to above in speaking of the second way of 
considering the self in contemporary philosophy) is certainly present and vitally 
important in one’s life, but is necessarily dependent on the subjective pre-reflective 
capacity of self-consciousness.64 Perhaps we can speak of the first immediate and 
62 Or meself as explained above. Of course, here one uses ‘myself’ to speak about one’s 
subjective experience. While it is true that, in speaking of subjective experience, one is 
making subjectivity an intentional object, one is really unfolding in ‘objective’ philosophical 
discourse what is primarily experienced subjectively. Of course, one can seriously interfere 
with certain aspects of one’s inner life by engaging in self-observation. This does not mean, 
however, that one cannot speak (objectively) of subjectivity at all. After all, even if one 
cannot speak or even engage in self-observation during some very personal and engaging 
experiences, one could speak after an experience of the experience’s subjective presentation.
63 Dan Zahavi, “Phenomenology of Self”, in The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry, ed. Tilo 
Kircher and Anthony David (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 61.
64 In fact, as Dan Zahavi argues, this means that an attempt to explain self-consciousness in 
terms of the higher-order representational theory cannot be right. According to this theory, 
a mental state becomes conscious (rather than non-conscious) if it stands in the relevant 
relation to a higher order thought or perception about that state (see the work of David 
Rosenthal, “Unity of Consciousness and the Self”, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 
[2002-3], 325-352, and William Lycan, “The Superiority of HOP to HOT”, in Higher Order 
Theories of Consciousness, ed. Rocco W. Gennaro [Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishers, 
2004], 93-114). Holding such a theory would mean, of course, that infants could have no 
subjectivity: there could be nothing it is like for them to be conscious of their own pain – a 
claim which seems implausible at best. But the hard philosophical question such higher-
order representational theorists need to answer regards the very possibility of non-conscious 
processes in and of themselves being the explanation of self-consciousness. That is, how 
could being the object of a non-conscious second-order thought or perception be enough to 
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implicit self-consciousness in terms of self-awareness and the second, derived, 
explicit, reflective, and often objectifying, conceptual and narrative form of 
self-consciousness in terms of self-knowledge. With respect to self-knowledge, 
it is easy to see that mistakes and doubts are very possible; it is also easy to see 
the importance of accompaniment of friends and significant others due to the 
ever-present possibility of self-deception.65 With respect to self-awareness, it is 
easy to see why Augustine held that one is by nature present to oneself. This is 
reflected in his distinction between se nosse and se cogitare; the former expresses 
self-presence while the latter has to do with self-knowledge. Se nosse indicates one’s 
experiencing oneself subjectively and non-intentionally – whether conceptually 
or non-conceptually –, ‘from within’. Se cogitare is self-reflection as an intentional 
act where one encounters oneself objectively, ‘from without’.66
Thus, se nosse is what is involved when we speak of one’s having self-
confidence or self-pity, or shame, or pride, or self-acceptance, or self-irony, or 
self-deception or self-integrity. In each case, we are speaking of more than a 
cognitive relation of the person to herself.67 For example, we want to say that 
self-deception is, in significant ways, different from someone’s deceiving someone 
else. Such cases as self-deception are not merely a matter of the stance a person 
takes towards herself either. It appears that self-relations ineluctably involve a 
subjective experience. It is as subject, and not only as object, that one deceives 
oneself or accepts oneself. Of course, se cogitare is concomitantly present and 
significant – one’s friends, or even oneself in one’s more reflective moments, 
could come to recognize what one is doing. One can come to understand that 
the circumstance about which one is deceiving oneself is thinkable by others or 
even by oneself from a third-person perspective.
My conclusion is that there is a real difference between our consciousness 
of an external object and our self-consciousness: the first personal ‘givenness’ of 
explain being conscious and even being self-conscious? One could add: how could a second-
order state recognize that a first-order experience belongs to the same subject as itself? It 
appears that some prior acquaintance with itself is necessary as given at some stage. (See 
Zahavi, “Phenomenology of Self”, 65). The higher-order representational theory can shed 
light on ‘objective’ self-consciousness but cannot provide an account for the first-person 
perspective in itself.
65 I am here using elucidations that Wittgenstein articulates in his set of notes On Certainty (see 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, trans. Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, ed. by G.E.M. 
Anscombe and G.H. von Wright [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977]). See my Self-Deception 
and Akrasia: A Comparative Conceptual Analysis, Analecta Gregoriana 300 (Rome: Gregorian 
University Press, 2006).
66 See Ludwig Hölscher, The Reality of the Mind: St Augustine’s Philosophical Arguments for the 
Human Soul as a Spiritual Substance (London and New York: Routledge, 1986), particularly the 
third chapter.
67 See John F. Crosby, The Selfhood of the Human Person (Washington, dc: CUA Press, 1996), 90.
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one’s self-consciousness appears to be irreducible to a third person account of any 
kind. Of course, one’s self-knowledge – which also has to do with one’s being with 
others and with one’s experience in the world – is intertwined with, and greatly 
enriches, one’s self-awareness. That being said, I wanted to show that the self, 
as a subjectively experiential dimension, is an integrated part of consciousness 
itself: self-consciousness does not arise from a prior conceptual distinction between 
myself and the world nor does it arise from a notional difference between myself 
and other selves; it is already involved in the very possibility of such distinctions.
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